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Abstract 
Argentina has traditionally stood out in terms of educational outcomes 
among its Latin American counterparts. Schooling among older children, 
however, still shows room for improvement especially among the more 
vulnerable. Fortunately, the last decade witnessed a sizeable 
improvement in attendance rates for children aged 15 through 17. This 
could be related to the 2006 National Education Law that made upper-
secondary education compulsory. In this paper, instead, we claim that the 
Asignación Universal por Hijo (AUH) a massive conditional cash transfer 
program implemented in 2009 in Argentina may be partly responsible for 
this improvement. Using a difference in difference model we estimate 
that the program accounts for a 3.9 percentage point increase in 
attendance rates among those eligible children aged 15 through 17. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Argentina has traditionally stood out within Latin America in terms of its 
educational standards. In particular, enrollment and attendance rates are the largest 
among the region. While primary education rates are almost perfect secondary 
education rates are far from being ideal (85% according to SITEAL) but still 
represent the highest standard in the region.  
 
There is, however, much room for improvement. These high average rates hide 
wide disparities among different groups: older and more vulnerable children 
probabilities of attending school are much lower. Opportunity costs rise driving 
upper secondary rates below the secondary attendance average. The issue becomes 
even more pressing among those belonging to poor families. 
 
Fortunately, both enrollment and attendance rates of secondary school have 
experienced a sizeable increase during the last decade in Argentina. This has been 
specially driven by improvements in attendance of those in the upper secondary 
age-range and among the most vulnerable.  
 
This improvement could be related to the National Education Law. Passed in 
December 2006, its main regulation implied the extension of compulsory education 
to upper secondary. We find, however, that neither the law nor accompanying 
policies had enforcement mechanisms embedded in their design. In fact, three 
years after the law was passed, attendance rates for those in the upper secondary 
age-range (15-17) were almost exactly the same.  
 
But if the 2006 National Education Law has no enforcement mechanisms, what 
encouraged children aged 15 to 17 (especially those most poor) to start attending 
school during the last decade? In this paper we claim that the Asignación Universal 
por Hijo (AUH) program implemented in 2009 may be driving this increase in 
attendance rates.  
 
Launched in Argentina in November 2009, it represents a massive conditional cash 
transfer program that currently benefits 29% of all children in the country. It is 
targeted at children living in poor families not registered in the formal employment 
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sector. Compliance with school attendance for children under 18 years old is one of 
the conditionalities imposed by the program in order to fully access the benefit. In 
this sense, the AUH may be working as an enforcement mechanism of the National 
Education Law. 
 
Estimating the causal effect of the AUH on school attendance rates, however, 
represents a rough task. The AUH was not assigned randomly nor it was 
accompanied by a publicly available comprehensive dataset that allows for 
assessing the program. We thus resort to the Permanent National Household 
Survey (Encuesta Permanente de Hogares - EPH) carried out in Argentina. We 
classify children in upper-secondary age-range (15 to 17) either as eligible or not 
eligible according to whether their parents comply with the program’s 
requirements. We compare their attendance rates across time following a difference 
in difference approach. 
 
Our estimates suggest that the AUH increased the secondary attendance rate for 
those aged 15 to 17 by 3.9 percentage points among those eligible. The impact 
seems to be higher for boys than for girls and among single-parent households 
where the head has lower education levels. The results are robust to different 
specifications and checks.  
 
This work intends to make a contribution in several realms. First of all, it adds to 
the literature on the impact of conditional cash transfers programs on educational 
outcomes. Secondly, and not least considering the relative scarce studies, it 
attempts to provide evidence of the effects of the Asignación Universal por Hijo, 
thus generating input for future improvements of the program. Finally, it also 
points out to the potential effectiveness of conditionalities as enforcement 
mechanisms of compulsory schooling. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 expands on the link 
between attendance rates in Argentina and compulsory education legislation. 
Section 3 concentrates on the main characteristics of the AUH program while 
briefly presents a review of related literature. The following section explains in 
detail the data and methodology used. The main results are presented in Section 5. 
The next two sections lay out robustness checks and explore heterogeneous effects 
respectively. The last section concludes and points to further research. 
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2. Attendance Rates and Compulsory Education in Argentina 
 
School enrollment and attendance rates have traditionally been quite high in 
Argentina relative to other Latin American countries. Primary net enrollment rates 
are almost perfect while secondary enrollment is approximately 85% (SITEAL), 
the highest level of the region.  
 
Despite this encouraging panorama, relevant challenges remain to be faced in the 
middle level. Drop-out rates are still large, especially among children belonging to 
vulnerable families. As of 2009, secondary enrollment rates between the richest 
40% and the poorest 30% differed by 20 percentage points (SITEAL). The issue 
becomes even more pressing among those in the last years of secondary education 
for whom the opportunity cost of attending school is much larger. As of 2009, 
according to our estimates attendance rates among children aged 15 to 17 
belonging to the first quintile barely reached 76% as compared to 95% of rich 
children (and the gap was even larger in previous years). As expected, the group 
consistent of poor older boys showed the worst attendance rates: 71%. 
Furthermore, a comparison of the 2001 and 2010 census reveals secondary 
education rates had remained practically the same during the decade especially 
among those aged 15 to 17: 79.4% and 81.6% respectively (INDEC 2010).  
 
Figure 1 – Attendance Rates by Age Groups2 
 
                                                          
2Administrative data shows a very similar pattern for secondary enrollment (DINIECE: 
http://portales.educacion.gov.ar/diniece/). 
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Nevertheless, both enrollment and attendance rates have improved during the last 
decade. This is true not only for children in secondary school as a whole but 
especially among those aged 15 to 17 for whom the larger opportunity costs of 
attending school were reflected in quite lower attendance rates.  
 
Most importantly, it seems attendance rates for those aged 15-17 have increased 
the most among the more vulnerable children (Figure 2). The first quintile 
attendance rate for that age group shows an 8 percentage points increase between 
2004 and 2014, while it has remained unchanged among the richest children for 
whom rates were almost perfect already. 
 
Figure 2. 15-17 Secondary Attendance Rates by Quintiles 
 
 
This improvement could be related to the National Education Law (N°26.206) 
passed in December 2006. Among other regulations, the law extended compulsory 
education to the last three years of secondary education (upper secondary). Primary 
education had been mandatory since the very creation of the National Education 
System (1884) while in 1993 the Federal Education Law had extended compulsory 
education from 7 to ten years.  
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Figure 3. Extension of Compulsory Education in Argentina 
 
 Indicates Compulsory Age 
 
 
Within the Latin American context, Argentina’s public free education system has 
traditionally stood out. Only five other Latin American countries have passed 
equivalent legislation (i.e. mandatory schooling for both primary and secondary 
education): Uruguay in 2008, Chile and Brazil in 2009 and Mexico only recently in 
2013 (Ruiz and Schoo 2014).  
 
In the more developed countries, legislation regarding extension of compulsory 
education to the middle school was passed earlier. In OECD countries, secondary 
level reforms started right after the Second World War. A first wave of legislation 
was passed between 1950 and 1960 concerning lower secondary. The second wave 
of expansion included upper secondary education and took place between 1980s 
and 1990s (Briseid and Caillods 2004). 
. 
Evidence on the impact of these changes in regulations on attendance rates is 
relatively scarce. While many studies concentrate on the effects regarding labor 
market outcomes (Angrist and Kruger 1991; Acemoglu and Angrist 2000;  
Oreopoulos 2006a, 2006ba) the evidence of the impact on schooling outcomes is 
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are unclear. In many countries, these changes in legislation were accompanied by 
the reduction or even abolition of fees, the massive construction of schools and in 
some cases even established fines for those not complying with the law.  
 
Regarding Argentina, taking advantage of the different timing in the 
implementation of the Federal Education Law passed in 1993 Alzúa et al. (2010) 
show that extending compulsory education to those aged 12-14 had a positive 
impact on the number of years of education completed. The effect, however, seems 
to be small among poor children (an extra half year of education). Furthermore, the 
paper also points to several institutional changes that accompanied the law: 
changes in the curricula and an extended budget (around US$ 3,000 million was 
invested in educational infrastructure and training). Thus, the mechanism through 
which schooling outcomes improved following the 1993 Federal Law remains 
unclear. 
 
The simultaneous implementation of the 2006 National Education Law across all 
provinces prevents to perform a similar causal impact analysis for the expansion of 
mandatory education to those aged 15-17. Furthermore, while the 1993 Federal 
Education Law was followed by sharp increases in 13-14 enrollment rates (the age 
group affected by the 1993 law), the National Education Law of 2006 had virtually 
no impact on 15-17 age range enrollment rates (the group for which compulsory 
education was extended in 2006). Indeed, even though departing levels were 
similar, while 13-14 rates augmented from 84% to 92% approximately between 
1993 and 1997 (Alzúa et al 2010), 15-17 enrollment rates remained virtually the 
same three years after 2006:  
 
Table 1. Attendance Rates 15-17 age-group. 
 
Attendance Rates 15-17 
2004 81.1 
2005 81.2 
2006 82.3 
2007 82.7 
2008 80.1 
2009 82.5 
  Source: our estimates from EPH 
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This is consistent with the fact that the 2006 National Education Law was passed 
rather as an “aspirational” law that aims at guaranteeing the universal access to 
education services for all children aged 4 through 17. Indeed, the legislation has 
not relied on effective enforcement mechanisms to achieve its ends. Public 
education has traditionally been free in Argentina and virtually no punishments 
exist for those not complying with the law. It was, nonetheless, accompanied by 
some policies aimed at fostering school enrollment. In particular, a National 
Secondary Education Plan was launched simultaneously, but it was more focused 
on establishing an adequate normative framework and on improving institutional 
arrangements than in intervening directly on school attendance (UNICEF 2012).  
 
But if the 2006 National Education Law has no enforcement mechanism embedded 
and does not seem to have had an impact on attendance rates for those aged 15-17 
four years after its implementation, what is driving the documented increase as of 
2010? (See Figure 1) What is encouraging children aged 15 through 17, especially 
poor children, to start attending school?  
 
3. The AUH Program 
 
By 2009, attendance rates for those aged 15 through 17 were at a standstill. As 
shown in the previous section, in spite of the 2006 National Education Law that 
made attendance compulsory for that age range no relevant increases had taken 
place in over a decade (INDEC 2010). In that context, the Asignación Universal 
por Hijo (AUH) program was launched.  
 
Implemented in November 2009, the AUH represents a massive conditional cash 
transfer program that focuses on children living in vulnerable households. It was 
designed to extend the social protection network –generally tied to the formal 
sector- to the more vulnerable sectors of the population. The magnitude of the 
benefit as well as the expansion in the number of beneficiaries have no precedents 
in social policy in Argentina. In fact, the AUH was designed so as to replace many 
social programs which will be gradually eliminated. Therefore, it was made not 
compatible with transfers coming from any other social plan.  
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The AUH awards a monetary contribution per child to households where neither 
parents is registered in the formal sector. This includes all those inactive, 
unemployed, or informal (but earning less than the minimum wage)3. A special 
consideration is made for those parents working in the domestic service: even for 
those registered in the formal sector, applications to the program are allowed. It 
consists of a monthly payment for each child under 18 and for handicapped 
children with no age limit. Each household can perceive the AUH for a maximum 
of five children.  
 
Since one of the aims of the AUH is to encourage human capital accumulation, the 
payment is divided in two parts. 80% of the transfer is received on a monthly 
basis, regardless of compliance with the program sanitary and educational 
requirements. In contrast, the remaining 20% is paid annually, once the requisites 
have been accomplished: school attendance, vaccination and periodical health 
controls. Originally, the program required that the child be enrolled in a public 
school. This clause, however, was never made effective given the large public 
opposition that claimed that many potential beneficiaries attended private schools 
with very low fees, generally subsidized with public resources. 
 
The amount of the transfer has been modified since 2009, to cope with inflation 
rates. As of June 2015, the monthly transfer for each child is of $837 which 
represents 15% of the minimum wage in Argentina. Considering a family made of 
three children (the average among the first four deciles of the income distribution), 
this implies almost a 50% increase in income for a family earning the minimum 
wage. The annual payment of the retained 20% implies that if the educational (and 
health) conditionalities are met, the family receives for each child around $2000 at 
the beginning of the year.  
 
Currently, more than 3.600.000 children benefit from these transfers, representing 
almost 29% of all children living in Argentina (ANSES 2012). Taking almost 
0.8% of the GDP, this program represents one of the largest of its kind in Latin 
America.  
 
                                                          
3 For a detailed description of the characteristics of the program: http://www.anses.gob.ar/asignaciln-
universal/asignaciln-universal-hijo-144 
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The expected impact of the conditional cash transfers on educational outcomes 
may be traced in the literature. Some surveys expose the main conclusions in this 
regard. Cecchini (2014) states that while cash transfer programs have had a clear 
positive income in terms of ‘access to school’ indicators (improvements in 
enrollment and attendance rates) their capacity to induce changes in the final ends 
of educational systems (i.e., the effective learning of the children) remains rather 
unclear. Saavedra and García (2012) point to several factors that are associated 
with larger increases in these ‘access to school’ indicators of cash transfer 
programs: lower baselines, higher economical vulnerability among beneficiaries, 
conditionalities and less frequent payments seem to enlarge the impact of the 
programs.  
 
In Latin America cash transfer programs have flourished abundantly and so has the 
literature aimed at evaluating them. Consistent with the mentioned surveys, the 
documented evidence in general points to improvements in educational outcomes. 
Even though the impacts differ across countries and are of course tied to the 
particular characteristics of the programs, in general results show that conditional 
cash transfer programs improve the so-called “intermediate objectives”: better 
access to school, higher enrollment rates, higher attendance (Cecchini 2014, 
Bastagli 2008). More relevant effects are usually found where initial levels were 
lower and among the most vulnerable families. In the case of Progresa (Mexico), 
evidence shows a significant increase in enrollment rates especially among 
secondary school children (Schultz 2004) improvement in the probability of 
attending school (De Braw y Hoddinott 2008), a reduction of the gender gaps in 
secondary enrollment in rural areas (Parker 2003) as well as increases in 
indigenous children enrollment (Escobar y de la Rocha 2002, 2008) and reductions 
in drop-outs (SEDESOL 2008). For Borsa Familia (Brasil), attendance rates seem 
to increase between 2 and 4 percentage points on average across all levels (Silveira 
Neto 2010, De Braw 2012). Familias en Acción (Colombia) seems to have had 
more impact in attendance rates among children in secondary education (Attanasio 
et al. 2008). Tekopora (Paraguay) has contributed to increase in 2.5% the 
enrollment and between 5 and 8 percentage points the attendance rate among the 
beneficiary children (Veras Soares, Pérez Ribas e Hirata 2008). 
 
As for the AUH in particular, the evidence of the program’s success is scarce in 
quantitative terms, probably due to the fact that publicly available official 
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household survey data in Argentina does not include a variable capturing AUH 
beneficiary status, turning difficult to perform a rigorous evaluation. In spite of 
this, different studies tend to confirm that its impact on income distribution 
variables as well as poverty indexes has been positive. Gasparini and Cruces 
(2010), Rofman and Olivieri (2011), Agis et al (2010), Bertranou and Maurizio 
(2012) agree that poverty rates have fallen, although differing in the size of the 
impact.  Some possible unplanned side-effects of the program have been evaluated 
as well, such as its impact on fertility decisions (Garganta et al. 2015), on formal 
market participation (Garganta et al. 2015) and female participation in the 
economy (Garganta et al. 2015). 
 
As for the AUH impact on human capital variables, the evidence is scarce. In 
terms of school attendance, using a difference in difference approach Paz and 
Golovanevsky (2014) find that in terms of primary school there is a significative 
yet very small increase in attendance rates in favor of those not eligible for the 
program, while the effect is large and positive for those between 13 and 17 
(around 7 percentage points). Taking advantage of the panel structure of the EPH 
they focus only on a two year window (2009-2010). The secondary level is 
analyzed as a whole, no evidence regarding lower and upper secondary differences 
is presented. Outcomes related to educational quality such as the educational gap 
have also been explored, but the effect is not clear and depends on the educational 
level under analysis (D’Elia and Navarro 2013). 
 
The mechanisms through which the AUH may improve educational outcomes 
seem rather straightforward. The very existence of the transfer relaxes the family’s 
budget constraints. Inasmuch as education may be regarded as a normal good its 
consumption could increase when household income does. The 20% conditionality 
sets an incentive to bias this increase in consumption towards investment in 
education. In this way, the AUH addresses several possible causes that may refrain 
children –and especially those in the upper-secondary age-range- from attending 
school: not being able to afford educational costs4, having the need to work to 
increase household income, being in charge of siblings while the household adults 
are at work, etc. Furthermore, the conditionality may tilt the balance of those on 
the verge of dropping out. Clearly, the effects of this benefit may be heterogeneous 
                                                          
4 Public education is free in Argentina. By educational costs we refer to transport and material costs. 
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across the population, as much of the mentioned literature points out. On the one 
hand, smaller impacts should be expected for those outcomes (enrollment, 
attendance, etc) for which initial levels are already high. On the other hand, larger 
effects may take place for those in the upper levels, for whom the opportunity cost 
of being at school is higher. Finally, female educational outcomes may be more 
difficult to improve to the extent that female education demand seems to be more 
inelastic (Sosa-Escudero & Marchionni 2000).The potential effects of the program 
as well as its differentiated impact, however, may only be assessed by way of 
empirical verification. 
 
4. Data and Empirical Strategy 
 
This paper intends to explore whether the AUH program in Argentina is 
responsible for the last decade increase in enrollment rates for those aged 15 
through 17. With this aim at hand, the ideal procedure would be to compare the 
attendance rates of two groups of children aged 15-17, similar in every aspect but 
for their participation in the program. This strategy is unfeasible for two reasons: as 
mentioned earlier, the implementation of the AUH in Argentina was neither based 
on a randomly designed selection process nor accompanied by a publicly available 
comprehensive dataset that may allow for follow-ups of the beneficiary population. 
The absence of these features greatly determinates both the data and the empirical 
strategy that may be used for assessing the program’s impact in any planned 
(and/or unintended) outcome.  
 
In the present work we resort to the Permanent National Household Survey (EPH) 
carried out by the National Statistics Office (INDEC). This survey is carried out 
quarterly in Argentina and gathers data on demographic, income and employment 
issues. It covers urban areas, representing 62% of total country population. 
Unfortunately, even though it includes several questions regarding educational 
characteristics of the individuals, the survey does not indicate whether the child 
receives the AUH or not. We therefore are able, at most, to identify those children 
that are eligible for the program and thus we may not estimate other than an 
‘intention to treat’ effect. 
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Our universe includes children in the upper-secondary age range (15-17). We 
define a ‘treatment’ and a ‘control’ group based on their eligibility, which in turn is 
defined by their parents’ status on the labor market. A child is classified as 
belonging to the ‘treatment’ group whenever his/her parents are either inactive, 
unemployed, informal or self-employed workers, or registered in the formal sector 
but working in the domestic service. The control group includes all those children 
in the upper-secondary age-range for whom at least one of their parents is 
employed in the formal sector.  
 
Both groups are circumscribed to the first four deciles, since the focus of the 
program is set on vulnerable families. Nevertheless, it is still possible that non-
registered middle and high income earners apply for the program given that the 
condition of “earning less than the minimum wage” is easily evaded. Qualitative 
(Pautassi et al. 2013) and quantitative evidence (Garganta et al., 2015), however, 
indicate that even if some cases may exist, they are isolated and scarce. 
Furthermore, our results are robust to different cut-offs.   
 
As for the attendance rates, an individual aged between 15 and 17 years old is 
considered to be attending school if he or she goes to secondary school. 
Unfortunately, the EPH does not include information on the specific year the child 
is attending. We will concentrate on data for the first semester over the 2004-2014 
decade. 
 
We follow a difference-in-difference methodology (DD), comparing the differences 
in attendance rates of the treatment and control group before and after the AUH 
was implemented. Given the time span of our data, ‘before’ will include years from 
2004 through 2009 (the AUH was launched in November) and ‘after’ is restricted 
to the 2010-2014 period.  
 
This methodology allows for avoiding some of the endogeneity problems that may 
bias our estimates given the fact that we are comparing different individuals across 
time. Our identification assumption is that in the absence of the AUH program, the 
attendance rates of both groups would have remained similar after 2009. 
Simultaneously, we are assuming that there was no event contemporaneous to the 
AUH implementation that may have affected differently both groups in terms of 
their school attendance.  
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We propose a standard linear specification of the DD model: 
 
𝐴𝑖 =∝ +𝛽1𝑇𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 + 𝛾(𝑇𝑖 . 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟)+𝜃 𝑋𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖   (1) 
 
Where 𝐴 is a binary variable indicating whether the individual attends secondary 
school; 𝑇 identifies whether the child belongs to the treatment or control group; 
After tags periods after the AUH implementation and 𝑋 includes a set of child and 
household level controls. We also control for time (year and quarter dummies) 
regional fixed effects and regional trends. 
 
By defining two periods (i.e., ‘before’ (0)  and ‘after’ (1)) we may show that the 
mean difference in attendance rates between those in the treatment and those in the 
control group is given by:  
𝐷𝐷 = (𝐴1
𝑇 − 𝐴0
𝑇) − (𝐴1
𝐶 − 𝐴0
𝐶)  (2) 
 And thus:  
𝐷𝐷 = 𝛾 + (𝜇1
𝑇 − 𝜇0
𝑇) − (𝜇1
𝐶 − 𝜇0
𝐶)  (3) 
 
By assuming that the unobserved characteristics of the treatment and control 
groups do not have a differential impact on their schooling attendance, we may 
claim that the 𝛾 parameter represents the causal effect of the program. Indeed, this 
assumption is crucial in a program such as the AUH that was not randomly 
assigned. Only by way of it we may sustain that the expected value of the latter 
terms is zero and thus obtain a consistent estimator of the treatment effect 
represented by 𝛾.  
 
5. Results 
 
Table 2 shows that attendance rates for upper secondary increased for both the 
treatment and the control group after the AUH implementation. The effect, 
however, was considerably larger for the former: 5.1 percentage points increase for 
the treatment group as compared to 1.9 for the control group. This preliminary 
evidence suggests that the program may have had the effect of rising upper 
secondary attendance rates by 3.2 percentage points.  
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Table 2 - Differences in Upper Secondary Attendance Rates 
 Treatment (i) Control (ii) (i)-(ii) 
    
Before AUH 75.1 87.0 -11.9 
After AUH  80.2 89.0 -8.7 
    
Difference (After-Before) 5.1 1.9 3.2 
        Source: our estimates from EPH 
It is true, however, that the very nature of the program and its non-random 
assignment implies that both groups differ both in their characteristics and, 
consequently, in their attendance rates prior to the program. Table 3 shows that in 
fact the treatment group differs from the control group in two significant aspects: it 
is poorer on average and includes a larger proportion of single-parent and female 
headed households. As for human capital variables, on average in both groups 
household heads finished primary and continued for one or two years into 
secondary school, even though it is true that household heads belonging to the 
treatment group show on average one less year of education. Households seem to 
have the same size on average and the difference in the number of children per 
household is negligible. 
 
Table 3 - Descriptive Statistics 
 Before After 
 Treatment 
Group 
Control 
Group 
Difference 
P-
Value 
Treatment 
Group 
Control 
Group 
Difference 
P-
Value 
Male 51.5 51.0 0.0 0.6 51.0 51.5 0.0 0.9 
Single-Parent 
HH 
36.7 17.2 19.5 0.0 37.3 16.8 20.5 0.0 
Female  
(HH head) 
38.9 20.2 18.7 0.0 44.4 25.2 19.2 0.0 
Age (HH head) 46.9 45.9 1.0 0.0 46.0 46.8 0.8 0.0 
Years of 
Education 
(HH head) 
7.9 9.0 -1.1 0.0 8.2 9.7 -1.5 0.0 
Household Size 6.0 6.0 0.0 0.4 5.8 5.7 0.1 0.1 
Number of 
Childre under 18 
3.3 3.2 0.1 0.0 3.2 3.1 0.2 0.0 
Per Capita 
Income 
184.4 290.7 -106.3 0.0 696.0 997.4 -301.4 0.0 
Observations  12,466 6,363 
  
10,002 6,171   
Source: our estimates from EPH. 
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These differences are reflected in the different levels of the attendance rates for 
each group prior to the implementation of the program. Nevertheless, albeit 
attendance rates levels differed before the AUH started, we claim that the time 
patterns were similar, as may be appreciated in Figure 4 and confirmed by the 
results of a pre-program common trends test: we find no enough evidence to reject 
the null hypothesis that the pre-treatment trends were equal5. Thus, even though 
upper-secondary attendance rates were higher for the control group than for the 
treatment groups before the program, both groups were experiencing similar 
increasing trends. This in turn provides evidence in favor of our identification 
assumption (i.e. trends for both groups would have remained similar after 2009 if 
the AUH had not been launched), even though it may not be tested. 
 
Figure 4. 15-17 Secondary Attendance Rates: Treatment and Control Groups 
 
 
Table 4 shows the results of the linear model of attending school for those aged 15 
through 17 outlined in the previous section. In that model the coefficient of the 
interaction variable between the Treatment dummy (equals 1 if the child belongs to 
the treatment group and 0 if it belongs to the control group) and the After dummy 
                                                          
5 We run a model of our outcome of interest (attendance) on a constant, the treatment dummy, year 
dummies and the interactions between these latter variables including only pre-intervention years. We 
then apply an F test in which the null hypothesis (Ho) states that all the coefficients for the interaction 
terms are jointly equal to zero. We find no evidence to reject the null: Ho: F(5, 18,817)=0.47, 
Prob>F=0.80. We then run a new model that includes both pre and post-program years. The null 
hypothesis is now easily rejected: Ho: F(10, 34,980)=2.19, Prob>F=0.015. 
60
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Source: our estimates based on EPH
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(equals 1 for observations corresponding to years 2010 through 2014 and 0 for the 
previous period) is positive and statistically significant in all the specifications. 
Models 1, 2 and 3 in the table progressively control for child and household head 
characteristics (gender, household head´s gender, age, squared age, educational 
level), other household characteristics (total number of members, single-parent 
household, per capita income) and region (6 regions) time fixed effects (years and 
quarter) and regional trends. The treatment effect remains almost the same across 
specifications and it implies that the mean attendance rate for the treatment group 
is around 4 percentage points higher than it would have been in the absence of the 
program.  
 
Table 4 – AUH Impact on School Attendance – 15 to 17 age range 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
Treatment*After 0.0345*** 0.0385*** 0.0387*** 
 (0.00813) (0.00918) (0.00912) 
    
Treatment -0.0809*** -0.0807*** -0.0793*** 
 (0.00600) (0.00636) (0.00641) 
    
After 0.00987 -0.000290 0.0354 
 (0.00619) (0.00690) (0.0427) 
    
Child and HH head’s 
characteristics 
Yes Yes Yes 
Other HH Characteristics No Yes Yes 
Regional and Time 
Dummies, Regional Trends 
No No Yes 
    
Observations 35,002 35,002 35,002 
 
 Source: our estimates based on EPH. 
 Note: OLS estimations. Dependent binary variable: Attendance, equals 1 if the child is  15-
17 years old and attends secondary level; Treatment equals 1 for eligible children and 0 for  
non-eligible children; After equals 1 in the period 2010-2014 and 0 for the period 2004-
2009; child´s and/or household head´s characteristics (gender, household head age, 
household head squared age, household head educational level), other household 
characteristics (household size, per capita income, single headed household), region fixed 
effects (6 regions), time fixed effects (years and quarter) and regional time trends. Clustered 
robust standard errors in parenthesis; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  
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Our estimations indicate that the effect of the AUH program on the treatment group 
is statistically significant. That is, in the absence of the program that group would 
have had lower attendance rates. In particular, the program seems to have increased 
secondary attendance rates among those eligible aged 15-17 by almost 4 
percentage points.  
 
6. Robustness Analysis 
 
In this section we carry out several robustness checks aimed at strengthening the 
results found in the previous section, either by contributing evidence in favor of our 
identification assumption or by showing that results are not sensitive to changes in 
operational definitions. In particular, we run the same lineal model for different 
placebo dates, for alternative samples and for a different definition of the pre-
intervention period. The placebo experiments show that it is only when considering 
2009 as the intervention date we may show consistent differences among the 
treatment and control groups. Furthermore, the evidence suggests that the effect 
does not depend upon the sample used nor on the definition of the  pre-intervention 
period.  
 
Placebo Experiments 
First of all, we run a series of placebo experiments that intend to contribute 
evidence in favor of our identification assumption, that is, that the attendance rate 
of the treatment group would have evolved in the same pattern that the control 
group in the absence of the program. With that aim, we run the same linear model 
but pretending that the program took place in any year previous to 2009 (when the 
AUH was really implemented). Table 5 shows the results for five alternative 
‘placebo’ dates: 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008. In all cases the coefficient 
accompanying the interaction term is not statistically significant. This implies that 
only in late 2009 some event shifted the attendance rates for the treatment group, 
clearly not before.  
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Table 5 – AUH Impact on School Attendance – 15 to 17 age range 
Placebo Regressions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
      
Treatment*After 0.0196 0.0256 0.0182 0.0169 0.0163 
 (0.0183) (0.0165) (0.0142) (0.0126) (0.0153) 
      
Treatment -0.0881*** -0.0896*** -0.0818*** -0.0776*** -0.0742*** 
 (0.0168) (0.0146) (0.0105) (0.00813) (0.00734) 
      
After -0.0542** 0.0421 0.0474 0.0485 0.0755* 
 (0.0232) (0.0400) (0.0401) (0.0393) (0.0428) 
      
Child and HH 
head’s 
characteristics 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Other HH 
Characteristics 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional and Time 
Dummies, Regional 
Trends 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Observations 18,829 18,829 18,829 18,829 18,829 
 
Source: our estimates based on EPH. 
Note: OLS estimations. Dependent binary variable: Attendance, equals 1 if the child attends 
upper secondary level; Treatment equals 1 for eligible children and 0 for non-eligible 
children; After is defined ad-hoc for each year (for example in 2006 it equals 0 in the period 
2004 to 2006 and 1 in the period 2007-2009); child´s and/or household head´s 
characteristics (gender, household head age, household head squared age, household head 
educational level), other household characteristics (household size, per capita income, 
single headed household), region fixed effects (6 regions), time fixed effects (years and 
quarter) and regional time trends. Clustered robust standard errors in parenthesis; * p<0.10, 
** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  
 
As stated before, this does not prove that it was the AUH that generated an 
improvement in secondary attendance rates for the 15-17 age-range, but rather that 
an event occurring in late 2009 did so. Other contemporaneous events may have 
taken place in that date and be responsible for these results. It is worth noting, 
however, that the AUH was a nation-wide massive program directly linked to 
educational outcomes through the conditionalities imposed not paralleled to any 
other program developed in the last decade. 
 
Alternative Samples 
One important consideration to be made: the AUH is awarded only if neither parent 
of the child has a formal job. Thus,  to determine eligibility we need to know both 
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parents’ employment conditions. This is not possible when one or none of the child 
parents live within the household6. We have thus defined three alternative nested 
samples that account for this three possible situations: (i) a sample that only 
contains those children for whom both parents are present; (ii) one that includes 
children for whom both or at least one parent are present; (iii) one that also 
incorporates those children living in households where neither parent is present. 
When considering our universe (children aged 15-17 belonging to the first four 
deciles) sample (i) represents 64.4% while sample (ii) adds up to 94.1% of our 
universe (sample (iii), by construction, holds the total universe). 
 
All of the analysis presented was carried out based on sample (ii). This choice is 
grounded on conceptual reasons. On the one hand, it extends sample (i) by 
including many single-parent, mostly female headed households where poverty 
rates are usually higher and are thus possibly more prone to belong to the treatment 
group. On the other hand, we are excluding those children for whom we have no 
information on neither of their parents working conditions. The sample, of course, 
suffers from the risk of including in the treatment group children that should 
belong to the control group: when the parent living with the children meets the 
program’s eligibility conditions but the parent not living within the household does 
not. Nevertheless, we estimate that at the most 9% of our sample could be wrongly 
classified in the treatment group7.  
Given that all the analysis has been conducted for sample (ii), in this section we 
include robustness checks using the alternative samples. The program effect in 
secondary attendance rates for those aged 15 to 17 is not altered when using these 
alternative samples (neither in magnitude nor in terms of statistical significance) as 
shown in table 6.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
6 The latter generally includes households where grandparents take care of children.  
7 This estimate derives from making quite pessimistic assumptions. On the one hand, we 
assume that all missing parents live and are recognized as such. On the other hand, we 
consider that missing parents have the same formality rate than present parents (around 
36%).  
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Table 6 – AUH Impact on School Attendance – 15 to 17 age range 
 Alternative Samples 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Sample (i) Sample (ii) Sample (iii) 
    
Treatment*After 0.0350*** 0.0387*** 0.0361*** 
 (0.0103) (0.00912) (0.00882) 
    
Treatment -0.0784*** -0.0793*** -0.0814*** 
 (0.00767) (0.00641) (0.00608) 
    
After 0.0579 0.0552 -0.0236 
 (0.0342) (0.0456) (0.0239) 
    
Child and HH head’s 
characteristics 
Yes Yes Yes 
Other HH Characteristics Yes Yes Yes 
Regional and Time Dummies, 
Regional Trends Yes Yes Yes 
    
Observations 23,953 35,002 37,207 
 
Source: our estimates based on EPH. 
Note: OLS estimations. Dependent binary variable: Attendance, equals 1 if the child attends 
upper secondary level; Treatment equals 1 for eligible children and 0 for non-eligible 
children; After equals 1 in the period 2010-2014 and 0 for the period 2004-2009; child´s 
and/or household head´s characteristics (gender, household head age, household head 
squared age, household head educational level), other household characteristics (household 
size, per capita income, single headed household), region fixed effects (6 regions), time 
fixed effects (years and quarter) and regional trends. Clustered robust standard errors in 
parenthesis; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  
 
Alternative definition of Pre-Intervention Period 
It could also be the case that the National Education Law of 2006 may have had 
some effect on upper-secondary attendance rates and thus it would be more 
accurate to establish the pre-intervention period not from 2004 to 2009 but from 
2007 to 2009. Table 7 shows that even restricting the pre-intervention period we 
find very similar results. Column (1) shows results for our linear model based on 
the 2004-2009 pre-intervention period while column (2) shows results taking 2007-
2009 as the pre-intervention period. Coefficients are quite similar in terms of 
magnitude and statistical significance. 
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Table 7 – AUH Impact on School Attendance – 15 to 17 age range 
Alternative Pre-Intervention Periods 
 (1) (2) 
 Pre-intervention 
period: 2004-2009 
Pre-intervention 
period: 2007-2009 
   
Treatment*After 0.0387*** 0.0331*** 
 (0.00912) (0.0100) 
   
Treatment -0.0793*** -0.0746*** 
 (0.00641) (0.00831) 
   
After 0.0604 -0.0171 
 (0.0390) (0.0248) 
   
Child and HH head’s 
characteristics 
Yes Yes 
Other HH Characteristics Yes Yes 
Regional and Time Dummies; 
Regional Trends Yes Yes 
   
Observations 35,002 27,035 
 
Source: our estimates based on EPH. 
Note: OLS estimations. Dependent binary variable: Attendance, equals 1 if the child attends 
upper secondary level; Treatment equals 1 for eligible children and 0 for non-eligible 
children; After is defined ad-hoc in each model (for column 1 it equals 1 in the period 2010-
2014 and 0 for the period 2004-2009, for column 2 it equals 1 for the same period but 0 for 
2007-2009); child´s and/or household head´s characteristics (gender, household head age, 
household head squared age, household head educational level), other household 
characteristics (household size, per capita income, single headed household), region fixed 
effects (6 regions), time fixed effects (years and quarter) and regional trends. Clustered 
robust standard errors in parenthesis; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  
 
7. Heterogeneity of Results 
 
As stated before, we expect to find disparities behind the average effect found on 
attendance. Following the literature, heterogeneities will most probably be linked 
to lower baseline levels of the indicator evaluated. In particular, in this section we 
explore differences across age ranges, gender and household head’s characteristics.  
 
Alternative Age Ranges 
Consistent with international evidence, the effect of the AUH diminishes for 
younger children among whom enrollment rates were already very high before the 
implementation of the program. In particular, for those in the age of attending 
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lower secondary school (12 to 14 years old) the effect is statistically significant but 
its magnitude is very small (the AUH program seems to have increased attendance 
rates by less than 1 percentage point among the treatment group). For those in 
primary school age-range (6 to 11), the effect is even smaller (0.4 percentage 
points).  
 
Table 8 – AUH Impact on School Attendance  
Alternative Age Ranges 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 6-11 12-14 15-17 
    
Treatment*After 0.00422*** 0.00834** 0.0387*** 
 (0.00152) (0.00314) (0.00912) 
    
Treatment -0.00400*** -0.0159*** -0.0793*** 
 (0.00110) (0.00261) (0.00641) 
    
After -0.0231* -0.00595 -0.0159 
 (0.0119) (0.0173) (0.0264) 
    
Child and HH head’s 
characteristics 
Yes Yes Yes 
Other HH Characteristics Yes Yes Yes 
Regional and Time 
Dummies, Regional Trends Yes Yes Yes 
    
Observations 69,332 34,904 35,002 
 
Source: our estimates based on EPH. 
Note: OLS estimations. Dependent binary variable: Attendance, equals 1 if the child attends 
the corresponding level (primary if 6 to 11 years old, secondary otherwise); Treatment 
equals 1 for eligible children and 0 for non-eligible children; After equals 1 in the period 
2010-2014 and 0 for the period 2004-2009; child´s and/or household head´s characteristics 
(gender, household head age, household head squared age, household head educational 
level), other household characteristics (household size, per capita income, single headed 
household), region fixed effects (6 regions), time fixed effects (years and quarter) and 
regional trends. Clustered robust standard errors in parenthesis; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** 
p<0.01.  
 
Ages 
It is interesting to explore if and how effects differ within the 15-17 age range. 
Both the literature and the preceding results suggest that the effect should decrease 
with age. Surprisingly, our estimates show a rather unclear pattern that is not 
consistent with this evidence. Table 9 shows that the greatest effect seems to be 
operating among older children.  
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Table 9 – AUH Impact on School Attendance  
Alternative Ages 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 15 years old 16 years 
old 
17 years 
old  
    
Treatment*After 0.0434*** 0.0278 0.0522*** 
 (0.0132) (0.0166) (0.0160) 
    
Treatment -0.0753*** -0.0568*** -0.107*** 
 (0.00933) (0.0103) (0.00944) 
    
After -0.0358 -0.0516 0.0635 
 (0.0352) (0.0487) (0.0499) 
    
Child and HH head’s 
characteristics 
Yes Yes Yes 
Other HH Characteristics Yes Yes Yes 
Regional and Time 
Dummies, Regional Trends 
Yes Yes Yes 
    
Observations 12,481 11,354 11,167 
 
Source: our estimates based on EPH. 
Note: OLS estimations. Dependent binary variable: Attendance, equals 1 if the child attends 
secondary school; Treatment equals 1 for eligible children and 0 for non-eligible children; 
After equals 1 in the period 2010-2014 and 0 for the period 2004-2009; child´s and/or 
household head´s characteristics (gender, household head age, household head squared age, 
household head educational level), other household characteristics (household size, per 
capita income, single headed household), region fixed effects (6 regions), time fixed effects 
(years and quarter) and regional trends. Clustered robust standard errors in parenthesis; * 
p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  
 
Gender 
In terms of gender, it seems all the increase in attendance rates was driven by 
improvements in boy’s attendance: their rate augmented in about 5 percentage 
points while the effect on girls is not statistically significant. This is consistent both 
with the fact that initial rates were lower for that group (around 70% as compared 
to 80% of girls among the treatment group) and with evidence shown in the 
literature that points out that girls educational demand is rather inelastic (Sosa-
Escudero and Marchionni 2000) 
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Table 10 – AUH Impact on School Attendance  
Gender 
 (1) (2) 
 Boys Girls 
   
Treatment*After 0.0576*** 0.0179 
 (0.0111) (0.0124) 
   
Treatment -0.105*** -0.0523*** 
 (0.00821) (0.00756) 
   
After 0.0190 0.0495 
 (0.0391) (0.0436) 
   
Child and HH head’s characteristics Yes Yes 
Other HH Characteristics Yes Yes 
Regional and Time Dummies, 
Regional Trends 
Yes Yes 
   
Observations 17,822 17,180 
 
Source: our estimates based on EPH. 
Note: OLS estimations. Dependent binary variable: Attendance, equals 1 if the child attends 
secondary school; Treatment equals 1 for eligible children and 0 for non-eligible children; 
After equals 1 in the period 2010-2014 and 0 for the period 2004-2009; child´s and/or 
household head´s characteristics (gender, household head age, household head squared age, 
household head educational level), other household characteristics (household size, per 
capita income, single headed household), region fixed effects (6 regions), time fixed effects 
(years and quarter) and regional trends. Clustered robust standard errors in parenthesis; * 
p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  
 
Household Type 
The AUH shows larger effects on the 15-17 attendance rate in single-parent 
households and where the head shows low levels of education (less than 
secondary). This is consistent with the fact that children belonging to those 
households presented lower attendance rates by 2009. 
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Table 11 – AUH Impact on School Attendance  
Household Type 
      
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
 Two-
Parent 
Single- 
Parent 
 Low 
Education 
High 
Education 
      
Treatment*After 0.0370*** 0.0414***  0.0341*** 0.0251* 
 (0.0111) (0.0148)  (0.0104) (0.0142) 
      
Treatment -0.0768*** -0.0729***  -0.0875*** -0.0470*** 
 (0.00790) (0.00967)  (0.00740) (0.00973) 
      
After 0.0589 0.0413  0.108** 0.0267* 
 (0.0456) (0.0885)  (0.0523) (0.0147) 
      
Child and HH head’s 
characteristics Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Other HH 
Characteristics 
Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Regional and Time 
Dummies, Regional 
Trends 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
      
Observations 17,822 17,180  25,505 9,497 
 
Source: our estimates based on EPH. 
Note: OLS estimations. “Low Education” includes household which head has less than 
secondary school education, “High Education” refers to households where head completed 
secondary education. Dependent binary variable: Attendance, equals 1 if the child attends 
secondary school; Treatment equals 1 for eligible children and 0 for non-eligible children; 
After equals 1 in the period 2010-2014 and 0 for the period 2004-2009; child´s and/or 
household head´s characteristics (gender, household head age, household head squared age, 
household head educational level), other household characteristics (household size, per 
capita income, single headed household), region fixed effects (6 regions), time fixed effects 
(years and quarter) and regional trends. Clustered robust standard errors in parenthesis; * 
p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
8. Concluding Remarks and Further Research 
 
Attending school at certain age ranges involves a large opportunity cost. It is 
common knowledge that attendance rates tend to fall as educational levels proceed, 
especially among less developed countries. Upper-secondary education thus 
generally shows attendance rates far from being complete, and the issue is more 
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severe among the economically vulnerable. Laws aimed at making higher levels 
compulsory do not seem to produce relevant effects unless they include 
enforcement mechanisms, either embedded in their own design or as 
accompanying policy. 
 
The Asignación Universal por Hijo in Argentina may be regarded in those terms: a 
large massive cash transfer program destined to those living in vulnerable 
conditions that includes a conditionality scheme aimed at encouraging families to 
invest in education at all compulsory levels. It is in this sense that it may work as 
an enforcement mechanism of the compulsory education laws, especially to the 
National Education Law of 2006 that turned upper secondary education mandatory.  
 
Using a difference-in difference strategy based on the National Permanent 
Household Survey data we are able to identify a 3.9 percentage point increase in 
the secondary attendance rates for those aged 15 through 17 among potential 
beneficiaries. This increase in not homogenous: the effect seems to be larger for 
boys and for children living in single-parent households where household head’s 
education is lower. The result is robust to several specifications and a large set of 
checks.  
 
Further research should point in several directions. A first relevant issue would be 
to unravel which mechanisms within the AUH are responsible for the increase in 
attendance rates. It is possible that the effect is given by the monthly benefit itself, 
or driven by the conditionality, or both mechanisms could be operating 
simultaneously. A deep understanding of these alternative channels is indeed 
relevant in terms of improving the design of conditional cash transfer programs. 
Secondly, it would also be relevant to disentangle whether this effect is matched by 
a similar result in the employment realm. It could be expected that an increase in 
attendance rates may contribute to reducing employment among those aged 15-17. 
It could also be the case, however, that children aged 15-17 are not working, but 
taking care of siblings, and that the AUH in that case may be altering instead 
female participation rates which in turn may increase schooling among those in 
upper secondary without having any impact in those children’s employment. 
Although household decision processes are certainly difficult to assess, exploring 
this hypothesis would shed light on the mechanisms that are at work and thus 
further refine the AUH’s design.  
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